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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-WHEN Do THE EQUITIES Tip
THE SCALE TO REQUIRE AN ATTORNEY TO REMAIN IN A CASE
WITHOUT A CLIENT?
Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc. (1986)
In Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc.,' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit was confronted with a practical and ethical
dilemma created by an implicit conflict between the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility (the "Code") 2 and a local rule of court. 3 In a
case of first impression, the court was asked to reconcile Disciplinary
Rule 2-110(B)(4) of the Code, which imposes an absolute duty on an
attorney to withdraw from representation at a client's request, 4 and Lo-
cal Rule 18(c) of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which requires ju-
dicial approval prior to withdrawal. 5 Affirming the district court's
decision denying a law firm's motion to withdraw after its client had ter-
minated its representation, 6 the Third Circuit held that denial of the
1. 802 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1986).
2. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(4) and
2-110(A)(1) (1980). For the text of these provisions, see infra notes 24 & 26.
Note that the Disciplinary Rules of the Code have an analogous rule. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a) (3) (1983). Rule 1. 16(a)(3) of the
Model Rules provides:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a
client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from
representation of a client if:
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
Id.
3. E.D. PA. R. 18(c). For the text of this rule, see infra note 27.
4. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(4) (1980).
For the text of this provision, see infra note 24. However, DR 2-1 10(A)(1) ar-
guably limits this duty if permission from a tribunal is required. See MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-11 O(A)(1) (1980); see also Ohntrup,
802 F.2d at 679. For the text of DR 2-110(A)(1), see infra note 26.
5. E.D. PA. R. 18(c). For the text of this rule, see infra note 27.
6. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 680. It is generally recognized that a client has an
absolute right to discharge his attorney with or without cause. See, e.g., Kashefi-
Zihagh v. INS, 791 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1986) (party may terminate counsel's
representation at any time); Fluhr v. Roberts, 463 F. Supp. 745, 747 (W.D. Ky.
1979) (attorney-client relationship may always be terminated by client with or
without cause); Estee Candy Co. v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 1362 (Cust. Ct.
1972) (party litigant has right to discharge and to terminate contractual relations
with his attorney at any time); Paolillo v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines,
305 F. Supp. 250, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (client always has right to discharge his
attorney, even without cause). Moreover, once that relationship is terminated,
the attorney is generally required to withdraw. See, e.g., Carlson v. Nopal Lines,
460 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1972) (client may discharge his attorney and attor-
ney may not then insist that attorney-client relationship continues after dis-
(895)
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motion did not create an ethical conflict with the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 7 and that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in reaching that decision. 8 The court noted, however, that a law
firm may be entitled to withdraw when its appearance no longer serves
any "meaningful purpose."
In Ohntrup, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius ("Morgan"), a Philadelphia-
based law firm, was retained by Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu
("Makina"), a corporation owned entirely by the Turkish government,
to defend it in a products liability suit brought against it by Mr. and Mrs.
Ohntrup in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.' 0 Following a lengthy trial, the district court entered a
charge); In re Collins, 246 Ga. 325, 271 S.E.2d 473 (1980) (client has "clear
right" to discharge attorney at any time, at which point attorney is "bound to
withdraw"); see also C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.5.4, at 552 (1986)
(client has right to discharge attorney at any time, making withdrawal impera-
tive); 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 220, at 387-90 (1980) (client has absolute right
to discharge attorney at will).
However, withdrawal may be limited by requiring court approval where
rights of other litigants or the administration ofjustice would be affected by such
action. See, e.g., Brand v. NCC Corp., 540 F. Supp. 562, 565 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(once counsel has entered appearance, client cannot then limit attorney's au-
thority to settlement negotiations; leave of court for withdrawal under Local
Rule 18 denied); In re Marriage of Milovich, 150 Ill. App. 3d 596, 615, 434
N.E.2d 811, 826 (1982) (party does not have unconditional right to discharge
attorney); 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 221, at 394 (1980) (withdrawal permitted
only when rights of others or court's administration are not affected).
7. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see
infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
8. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see
infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
Whether an attorney will be permitted to withdraw is within the discretion
of the trial court, which decision will generally be reversed only if plain error is
committed. See, e.g., Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Radcliffe on the Del., Inc., 439
Pa. 159, 164, 266 A.2d 698, 700 (1970) (no error in granting petition to with-
draw because proceedings had not yet reached "critical stage" of being listed for
trial); Farkas v. Sadler, 119 R.I. 35, 41, 375 A.2d 960,963 (1977) (trial judge did
not abuse discretion by denying motion to withdraw, since presentation of mo-
tion on second day of trial would require continuance, placing additional burden
on defendants); see also 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 222, at 401 (1980) (attorney
may withdraw without cause so long as withdrawal will not "work an injustice on
the other party"). Factors to be weighed by the court in connection with its
decision include the reasons supporting the request to withdraw, and the poten-
tial effect of that withdrawal on the efficient and proper functioning of the court
and other parties to the litigation. See, e.g., Farkas, 119 R.I. at 41, 375 A.2d at
963.
9. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 680. The Third Circuit suggested that such with-
drawal may be appropriate even absent the appearance of substitute counsel. Id.
For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 34 & 35 and accompa-
nying text.
10. 802 F.2d at 677. Plaintiff Robert Ohntrup sustained injury on May 2,
1975, while using a pistol which he had purchased from Firearms Center, Inc.
(FCI), and which had been manufactured by Makina. Id. Ohntrup and his wife
brought a products liability suit against FCI based on diversity of citizenship. Id.
FCI then impleaded Makina as third-party defendant, and the Ohntrups
2
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substantial judgment against Makina, which was subsequently affirmed
by the Third Circuit on Makina's appeal. I I Thereafter, when Makina
amended their complaint to include claims against Makina. Ohntrup v. Firearms
Center Inc. ("Ohntrup v. Firearms"), 516 F. Supp. 1281, 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
11. Appeal of Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu, 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.
1985), aff'g mem., Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa.
1981). Morgan defended Makina during a bifurcated trial through two of its
partners, John R. McConnell and Arthur R. Littleton. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 677.
Ultimately, the district court entered ajudgment of $847,173.97 against Makina.
Id. Given prevailing interest rates, the award is now worth more than
$1,000,000. Brief of Appellees at 6, Ohntrup (No. 85-1783).
On the eve of trial, Makina moved to dismiss all claims against it, by invok-
ing sovereign immunity to thus deprive the court ofjurisdiction. Ohntrup v. Fire-
arms, 516 F. Supp. at 1283. Addressing the plaintiffs' contention that Makina
had "impliedly waived" its right to invoke sovereign immunity, the district court
conceded that since Makina is a Turkish corporation wholly owned by the Turk-
ish government, it is a "foreign state" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1603(a) and (b) (1982), and would therefore be immune from suit under 28
U.S.C. § 1604. Id. at 1284. Section 1603(a) defines a "foreign state" to include
"a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state as defined in subsection (b)," which states:
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any
entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or a political subdivision
thereof.., and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... nor
created under the laws of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1982). Section 1604 grants immunity "from the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the United States" to foreign states, "except as provided in
section[] 1605" (commercial activity exception). See id. § 1604.
However, the district court held that the commercial activity exception of
§ 1605(a)(2) applied to Makina, since Makina's commercial activities which gave
rise to the suit created "substantial contact" with the United States, and Makina
had intended that the guns be imported and sold here. Ohntrup v. Firearms, 516
F. Supp. at 1285-86. Section 1605 states general exceptions to the jurisdictional
immunity of a foreign state, set forth in § 1604, by providing that a foreign state
shall not be immune in any case:
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by a foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). Under this section, foreign sovereign immunity is lim-
ited to suits involving public acts of the foreign state, and therefore does not
extend to cases arising from its strictly commercial acts. Verlinden B. V. v. Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). Therefore, where a foreign govern-
ment participated in "commercial activity" in the United States, within the
meaning of § 1605(a)(2), it is subject to suit in American courts. Transamerican
S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1985). It is
this commercial activity exception within which the court determined Makina's
activity fell. Ohntrup v. Firearms, 516 F. Supp. at 1285-86.
Furthermore, the district court held that Makina also met the "minimum
contacts" requirements of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1954). Ohntrup v. Firearms, 516 F. Supp. at 1285-86. The district court thus
3
Schmidt: Professional Responsibility - When Do the Equities Tip the Scale
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
refused to satisfy the judgment, the Ohntrups commenced discovery in
aid of execution, followed by motions to compel discovery. Makina con-
tinually failed to respond to these efforts. 12 During these proceedings,
the Ohntrups continued to serve all papers on Morgan.' 3
Despite Morgan's repeated attempts, Makina refused to communi-
cate with Morgan regarding what further action, if any, it desired Mor-
gan to take on its behalf.' 4 Morgan thus regarded its representation in
the matter as terminated and filed a motion with the district court for
leave to withdraw as counsel.15 Shortly thereafter, Makina confirmed by
telex that it no longer desired Morgan's representation. 16 Although
conscious of the potential practical problems that Morgan's continued
representation might create for the firm, ' 7 the district court denied Mor-
gan's motion to withdraw, indicating that Morgan must remain in the
case as Makina's representative until Makina made arrangements for
substitute counsel. ' 8
Before addressing the merits of the case, the Third Circuit dis-
missed the Ohntrups' contention that the court lacked appellate jurisdic-
tion because the lower court's denial of Morgan's motion for leave to
withdraw was not a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, therefore,
held that Makina was not immune from suit and denied Makina's motion to dis-
miss. Id.
12. 802 F.2d at 677-78. Plaintiffs' motions to compel discovery followed
Makina's continued refusal to cooperate. Id. Additionally, plaintiffs filed mo-
tions with the district court to fix the amount of delay damages, and to include
the Republic of Turkey in the judgment, in order to commence execution pro-
ceedings. Brief of Appellees at 5, Ohntrup (No. 85-1783). The district court
granted the motion to fix delay damages, but denied without prejudice the mo-
tion to include the Republic of Turkey. Id.
13. 802 F.2d at 678. Morgan apparently tried to contact Makina with re-
gard to the post-judgment proceedings, but Makina failed to respond. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. At the time of the appeal to the Third Circuit on the original action,
Morgan and Makina had an understanding that an adverse decision at that level
would terminate the representation. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 22A,
Ohntrup (No. 85-1783). Thus, when the Third Circuit affirmed the verdict and
entered judgment for plaintiffs, Morgan attempted to determine whether
Makina wanted it to take any further action on their behalf. Id. at 4. When its
repeated inquires met with no response, Morgan regarded its representation of
Makina as ended, a termination which Makina later confirmed, and Morgan filed
a motion for leave to withdraw. Id.
16. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 678.
17. Judge Pollak acknowledged that the decision to deny Morgan's motion
to withdraw was "to some degree imposing an unwanted and very possibly un-
compensated, in any event-compensated only with difficulty-burden, or set of
burdens on Morgan, Lewis and Bockius," but determined that "[t]hose burdens
• . . go with the territory." Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 40A (citing
Transcript of November 25, 1985, at 22, Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516
F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (No. 76-0742)).
18. 802 F.2d at 678. However, the court did grant the motion to withdraw
as it pertained to individual attorneys, McConnell, who had retired, and Lit-
tleton, who had left the firm. Id.
898 [Vol. 32: p. 895
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss3/11
1987] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 899
not appealable. 19 Recognizing the policy of avoiding piecemeal re-
view20 which underlies the finality requirement, the court observed that
this policy has diminished significance after the district court has ren-
dered final judgment, thus completely disposing of the merits of the
case. 21 Therefore, the Third Circuit reasoned that since the district
court's denial of Morgan's motion to withdraw "completely settled the
question of Morgan's withdrawal," ' 22 and followed the judgment en-
tered against Makina, Morgan's appeal was properly before the court. 23
Turning to the merits of the case, the court first considered Mor-
gan's contention that the court's denial of its motion had placed the firm
in an "unacceptable ethical position" under the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. 24 Acknowledging that the Code does require an
19. Id. Section 1291, relating to "[flinal decisions of district courts," pro-
vides in pertinent part: "The courts of appeal . . . shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from allfinal decisions of the district courts of the United States... except
where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1982) (emphasis supplied).
The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean that a party may
appeal only after a final judgment on the merits has been entered. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). In Risjord, the Supreme
Court held that a district court order denying a motion to disqualify counsel was
not an appealable order. Id. at 370. The Risjord Court emphasized that the
underlying purposes of § 1291 are to promote efficient judicial administration
and avoid piecemeal review. Id. at 374. However, the Third Circuit noted that
Risjord was distinguishable from Ohntrup because Risjord involved a pre-trial mo-
tion, as opposed to the Ohntrup order which followed the entry ofjudgment. 802
F.2d at 678. The court stated that the policy of avoiding piecemeal review is
likely to be less decisive afterjudgment. Id. (citing Plymouth Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Illinois Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 378 F.2d 389, 391 (3d Cir. 1967)). As a
result, the Third Circuit rejected the Ohntrups' reliance on Risjord. 802 F.2d at
678.
20. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 678. The court noted that, especially in cases in-
volving supplementary post-judgment orders, the finality requirement may be
given a "practical rather than a technical construction." Id. (quoting Plymouth
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Illinois Mid-Continental Ins. Co., 378 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1967)
(orders following settlement agreement are appealable)).
21. Id. The court cited with approval the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Sportmart, Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 601 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir.
1979) ("[Mlost post-judgment orders are final decisions within the ambit of 28
U.S.C. § 1291 as long as the district court has completely disposed of the mat-
ter."). Furthermore, if such orders were not considered final, no review would
be available where there is little prospect of further proceedings following final
judgment. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 678 (citing C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3916, at 607 (1976)).
22. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 678.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 679 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
1 10(B)(4) (1980)). DR 2-1 10(B)(4) of the Code mandates conditions for with-
drawal from employment: "(B) Mandatory withdrawal. A lawyer representing a
client before a tribunal, with its permission if required by its rules, shall with-
draw from employment. . . if: . . . (4) He is discharged by his client. DR 2-
1 10(B)(4) (1980). Notably, Pennsylvania has adopted the ABA Model Code with
some revisions and has adopted this section intact.
5
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attorney to withdraw its appearance when discharged by its client, 25 the
court pointed out that the mandatory withdrawal provision is qualified
by another Code section which prohibits withdrawal absent judicial ap-
proval, where court permission is required by the local rules.2 6 Since a
local rule of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania required court approval
prior to an attorney's withdrawal, unless a substitute attorney entered an
appearance, 27 the Third Circuit held that denying the firm's motion did
not place Morgan in conflict with the Code.2 8
Secondly, the court rejected Morgan's argument that the district
court abused its discretion when it denied the firm's motion to with-
draw. 29 In so holding, the court balanced the primary purposes of Local
Rule 18 with the countervailing difficulties which Morgan might face
were it required to remain in the case without a client.3 0 Specifically, the
Third Circuit opined that the district court's emphasis on the problems
of communicating with a Turkish corporation, and its characterization of
Makina as an "intractible [sic] litigant" supported the conclusion that
Morgan's withdrawal would prohibit effective communication with
Makina and, thus, interfere with the efficient administration of post-
25. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(4) (1980)). For the text of DR 2-110(B)(4), see supra note
24.
26. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITy DR 2-1 10(A)(1) (1980)). DR 2-1 10(B)(4) is qualified by DR 2-1 10(A)(l)
which provides: "If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by
the rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a pro-
ceeding before that tribunal without its permission." DR 2-110(A)(l) (1980).
27. E.D. PA. R. 18(c). Local Rule 18(c) of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania provides as follows: "An attorney's ap-
pearance may not be withdrawn except by leave of court, unless another attor-
ney of this court shall at the same time enter an appearance for the same party."
Id.
28. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679. Here, no substitute attorney entered an ap-
pearance, thus requiring Morgan to obtain approval by the district court in or-
der to withdraw its appearance. Id. The court thus rejected Morgan's argument
as lacking in merit and denied the firm's motion to withdraw. Id.
29, Id.
30. Id. Morgan argued that Makina's dismissal of Morgan effectively nulli-
fied the firm's authority to continue to actively represent Makina. Id. Therefore,
the court's order, requiring active representation, merely created practical diffi-
culties without aiding the Ohntrups' ability to collect their judgment. Id. The
Third Circuit disagreed, and noted several compelling factors which supported
its decision. First, the Ohntrups had won a sizeable judgment against Makina
and had begun proceedings to collect on that judgment. Id. Secondly, the
problems of maintaining contact with the defendant were exacerbated by the
facts that Makina was located in Turkey, was wholly owned by the Turkish gov-
ernment, many of its officers did not speak English, and Turkey itself lacked
modern communication techniques. Id. When balanced, the court weighed
these factors to require Morgan to remain in the case. Id. For a discussion of
the potential difficulties encountered by a law firm whose discharge has been
"forced," see supra note 17 and infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
900 [Vol. 32: p. 895
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judgment proceedings. 3 1 Therefore, the Third Circuit held that the dis-
trict court's finding, that the "court's need for effective communication
and efficient administration" 3 2 outweighed Morgan's concerns, did not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
3 3
However, the Third Circuit did reject the district court's suggestion
that Morgan should be required to continue its representation until
Makina arranged for alternate counsel. 34 The appellate court concluded
that a law firm may withdraw its appearance when it has satisfactorily
demonstrated to the trial court "that its appearance serves no meaning-
ful purpose, particularly insofar as an opposing interest is concerned."1
3 5
In Ohntrup, the Third Circuit recognized that under certain circum-
stances it may be unfair to allow an attorney to withdraw even if he is
discharged by his client.3 6 In identifying the need to limit an attorney's
31. Id. These observations were based on the record before the court. Id.
For a further discussion of these problems, see supra note 30.
32. Id. In contrast to the Third Circuit's conclusory statements, Judge Pol-
lak noted, in a well-reasoned and carefully articulated opinion from the district
court bench, in which he denied Morgan's motion to withdraw:
Our adversary system contemplates that each party, and most especially
when a party is an inadamant [sic] one, be represented by an attorney
or attorneys who, among other things, have the burden of maintaining
communication. The rules of this court contemplate that litigation be
carried on by parties who they themselves are situated in this district or
have attorneys situated in this district .... [T]his court has an institu-
tional obligation to see to it that things proceed as effectively as may be.
Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 38A-39A (citing Transcript of November
25, 1985, at 20-21, Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (No. 76-0742)).
33. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679. The court cited Washington v. Sherwin Real
Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982) for the applicable abuse of discretion
standard. Id. In Sherwin, the Seventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in granting the attorney's motion to withdraw, "since where an attor-
ney 'feels he will be unable ... to adequately represent his client he has a duty to
withdraw from the case.' " 694 F.2d at 1088 (quoting Green v. Forney Eng'g
Co., 589 F.2d 243, 247-48 (5th Cir. 1979)). The court stated that abuse of dis-
cretion could only be found " 'where no reasonable man could agree with the
district court.' " Sherwin, 694 F.2d at 1087 (quoting Smith v. Widman Trucking
& Excavating, Inc., 627 F.2d 792, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1980)).
The Third Circuit made particular note of the short time period between
the entry of judgment against Makina and the district court's decision on Mor-
gan's motion to withdraw, as well as the representation that plaintiffs contem-
plated further discovery in aid of execution. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 680. Since the
district court's findings were not "clearly erroneous," the Third Circuit refused
to hold that the lower court had abused its discretion. Id.
34. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679. The court reasoned that if withdrawal was not
available unless and until the litigant arranged for substitute counsel, withdrawal
by an attorney might never be possible in this type of situation. Id. at 679-80.
35. Id. at 680. The court's decision was without prejudice to Morgan's abil-
ity to renew its motion at a "later appropriate time," even absent the appearance
of substitute counsel, although the court presumed that Morgan would not with-
draw until the Ohntrups had "exhausted meaningful efforts to satisfy their judg-
ment." Id. at 680 & n.1.
36. Id. at 679; see also ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Lawco Energy, Inc., 86
7
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ability to withdraw from a case, the Ohntrup court balanced the interests
of the parties and the court. 37 Unfortunately, in affirming the district
court's decision denying Morgan's leave to withdraw, the Third Circuit
provided little reasoning or guidance 38 for future cases.
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's decision in Ohntrup necessar-
ily diminishes the significance of a client's well-established right to dis-
charge his attorney, 39 since the right to discharge an attorney is
nugatory unless the attorney is thereafter required to withdraw. 40 Nev-
ertheless, it may be appropriate to limit the right to discharge an attor-
ney when a client discharges his counsel in an attempt to avoid its legal
obligations. 4 1 In Ohntrup, Makina's apparent refusal to communicate
F.R.D. 708, 713 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (withdrawal denied since effective court ad-
ministration requires attorney to provide court with means to maintain commu-
nications with client); Thomas v. National State Bank, 628 P.2d 188, 189 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1981) (withdrawal refused when attorney's withdrawal would be preju-
dicial to all parties); In re Marriage of Milovich, 105 Ill. App. 3d 596, 615, 434
N.E.2d 811, 826 (1982) (withdrawal denied upon consideration of whether with-
drawal would " 'unduly prejudice the other party or interfere with the adminis-
tration of justice,' " and whether party seeking withdrawal would be prejudiced
by denial) (citation omitted); Farkas v. Sadler, 119 R.I. 35, 41, 375 A.2d 960, 963
(1977) (withdrawal refused after considering reasons necessitating withdrawal,
efficient and proper function of court and effect that granting or denying motion
will have on parties to litigation).
37. 802 F.2d at 679. The countervailing interests which the Third Circuit
attempted to weigh included: "(1) loyalty to his client; (2) respect for the tribu-
nal; and (3) fairness to others." L. PATrERSON, LEGAL ETHIcS: THE LAW OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 9 (2d ed. 1981).
The district court obviously recognized the countervailing interests
presented in this case: "No court is going to be eager to keep an attorney-client
relationship going on when it has sort of intrinsically deteriorated. But the
Court has institutional needs that are inclusive of, but to some extent transcend,
the particular interests of [Makina] and [Morgan] and [the Ohntrups] .... Brief
and Appendix for Appellant at 26A (citing Transcript of November 25, 1985 at
8, Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (No. 76-
0742)). This language from the district court's bench opinion indicates a con-
scious and careful balancing of the interests involved, while the Third Circuit
merely defined the purposes of Local Rule 18(c) as "providing for communica-
tions between the litigants and the court, as well as ensuring effective court ad-
ministration." Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679. One may only speculate, however, as
to whether the Third Circuit, by its failure to articulate a fuller analysis, intended
to implicitly adopt the lower court's reasoning. For the text of Local Rule 18(c),
see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. See Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679-80. In fact, the Third Circuit cited no case
law in support of its decision on the merits of Morgan's appeal. The court did
cite a Seventh Circuit case adopting "abuse of discretion" as the proper stan-
dard by which to review the district court's decision denying leave to withdraw.
Id. at 679 (citing Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081, 1087
(7th Cir. 1982)). For a discussion of Shenvin, see supra note 33.
39. For a discussion of a client's right to discharge his attorney at any time,
see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 6, § 9.5.4, at 552.
41. Id. § 9.5.2, at 546. Discharging his attorney does not necessarily relieve
the client of all responsibility; indeed, it may trigger further obligations associ-
[Vol. 32: p. 895
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with Morgan, and its "intractable" disposition during the proceedings,
made it reasonable to assume that by discharging its attorney, Makina
hoped to avoid satisfying the obligations imposed by the substantial
judgment entered against it by the district court. 42 Clearly, it is unfair to
require a plaintiff to shoulder the burden and expense of litigating a
case to verdict, only to be left with a defendant who refuses to satisfy a
judgment and who is beyond the reach of the court. 43 Therefore, it is
suggested that the Third Circuit correctly evaluated Makina's right to
discharge its attorney as insubstantial when balanced against the plain-
tiffs' rights to collect their judgment.44
Interestingly, however, the Ohntrup court's opinion was virtually
void of any discussion of the potential ramifications of its decision on
the other participants in the lawsuit. 4 5 Specifically, the Ohntrup court
failed to address adequately the significant effect the court's opinion will
have on the practicing attorney who might find himself forced to remain
in a case to "represent" a client who has discharged him. 46 It is sug-
gested that in Ohntrup, as well as in most other cases, requiring the law
firm to represent an adamant party like Makina will accomplish little
when that party does not wish to be so represented.
Although it is arguable that Morgan's continued representation was
the only reasonable means for the court to communicate with Makina
and supervise Makina's post-judgment conduct,4 7 this argument ignores
ated with self-representation. Id. For a discussion of limitations on a client's
right to discharge his attorney, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
42. See 802 F.2d at 678-79.
43. Id. at 679. If Morgan were permitted to withdraw, the court would be
"without the possibility of effective communication with Makina, as well as with-
out a reliable mechanism for responsible supervision of the post-judgment as-
pects of this litigation." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The court acknowledged the possibility that Morgan might face
"practical problems" in its continued representation, but dismissed that argu-
ment without discussion. Id.
46. Id. Despite any practical problems Morgan might encounter in the con-
tinued "active representation" required by the district court, the court con-
cluded that "Morgan's argument fails to pay adequate attention to the purposes
of Local Rule 18(c) and the difficulties the district court would face were Morgan
granted leave to withdraw at this time." Id. The court apparently sympathized
with the Ohntrups' unsuccessful efforts to collect a substantial judgment from a
government-owned foreign corporation, which had no American-based assets,
lacks the capacity to communicate in English, and which refused to pay the judg-
ment against it. Id. The court also recognized the district court's need for "re-
sponsible supervision of the post-judgment aspects of this litigation," and noted
that Local Rule 18 is intended to ensure effective communication and efficient
court administration. Thus, the court concluded that the district court had
"fairly balanced these concerns." Id.
47. Id. at 679. Morgan articulated a willingness to continue to forward
whatever documents to Makina that the court would require as a condition for
withdrawal until Makina had appointed substitute counsel, in order to conform
with the purpose of Local Rule 18(c) of maintaining effective communication
1987] 903
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reality. 48 It is suggested that in light of Makina's status as a foreign cor-
poration 49 and its past refusal to cooperate, it is reasonable to expect
between Makina and the court. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Ohntrup (No. 85-
1783). However, Morgan suggested that the continued active representation re-
quired by the district court's order was an "untenable application of Rule 18(c),"
since that representation would only create "unnecessary ethical and practical
problems" for Morgan without aiding the Ohntrups in collecting their judg-
ment. Id. at 2-4.
48. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2-4, Ohntrup (No. 85-1783). Morgan ar-
gued that once dismissed, it lacked authority to continue active representation of
Makina as the court's order required, thus creating "practical problems" for the
firm without facilitating the plaintiffs' efforts to collect their judgment. Id. The
court acknowledged that, practically speaking, Morgan could do little to compel
the uncooperative defendant to satisfy the judgment. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679.
Nevertheless, viewing Morgan's past ability to contact Makina as plaintiffs' only
hope of recovering their judgment, the court found that even this limited possi-
bility was sufficient to require Morgan to remain in the case. Id.
49. The court did not indicate whether the mere fact that Makina is a for-
eign corporation would be sufficient in itself to mandate Morgan's continued
representation. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679. The necessity for corporate counsel
raises two issues. First, it is well-established that a corporation, unlike an indi-
vidual, cannot proceed in a lawsuit pro se. Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp.
Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[A] corporation, which is an artificial
entity that can only act through agents, cannot proceed pro se."); Move Org. v.
United States Dep't ofJustice, 555 F. Supp. 684, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Because
organizational personality is a legal fiction, appearance in propria persona is im-
possible. Thus, the courts have repeatedly held that corporations . . . must be
represented by counsel."); Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 476
(N.D. Tex., W.D. Pa., N.D. Ind., D. Minn., S.D. Ala., W.D. Wis. 1975) ("Corpo-
rations and partnerships, both of which are fictional legal persons, obviously
cannot appear for themselves personally .... They must be represented by li-
censed counsel."), aff'd sub nom. Pilla v. American Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th
Cir. 1976), aff'd mem. sub nom. Taylor v. Montgomery, 539 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1976).
However, a court may order a corporation to retain substitute counsel, in-
stead of requiring an "unknown" attorney to continue to represent an intracta-
ble litigant. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Continental Record Co., 386 F.2d 426,
427 (2d Cir. 1967). Applying that alternative to Ohntrup, if Morgan had been
allowed to withdraw its appearance, the court could have ordered Makina to
retain a new attorney. Thereafter, had Makina failed to comply, the court could
have entered appropriate sanctions against it. See Shapiro, 386 F.2d at 427 (de-
fendant corporation's refusal to appoint new counsel in "cavalier disregard for a
court order" justified judicial relief); Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1184
(3d Cir. 1984) (no abuse of discretion "to enter a default judgment to sanction a
party who has callously disregarded repeated notices of ajudicial proceeding").
However, under the facts presented in Ohntrup, this may not be a viable
alternative.
Makina is not only a corporation, but it is also owned wholly by the Turkish
government, is located in Turkey, and claims that it has done no business with
American companies since 1975. 802 F.2d at 679. If a foreign defendant re-
fuses to cooperate, the court would not have the power to impose sanctions or
compel its cooperation as it would with a United States resident. Furthermore,
Makina apparently has no assets in this country which might be attached in order
to execute and enforce the judgment. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 31A
(citing Transcript of November 25, 1985 at 13, Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc.,
516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (No. 76-0742)).
[Vol. 32: p. 895
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that Makina would continue to ignore the court's directives. 50 By re-
quiring Morgan to remain as Makina's counsel, the Ohntrup court sug-
gests that Morgan can compel Makina to do that which the Ohntrups
and the court have been unable to do. 5 1 It is submitted that such a sug-
gestion is misplaced, especially in light of Makina's past conduct and its
clear desire not to retain Morgan as its counsel. Thus, requiring Mor-
gan to remain in the case, despite Makina's objection and refusal to sat-
isfy the judgment, is unlikely to advance the plaintiffs' claim. 52 Instead,
it only serves to impose an unwarranted burden on the firm. 53
It appears, therefore, that Makina's status as a foreign corporation could
have been a compelling factor in the court's balancing of the equities. However,
that was apparently not the basis of the Third Circuit's decision, as the court
expressly did "not consider the Ohntrup's [sic] argument that granting Morgan
leave to withdraw would violate the prohibition against corporations appearing
in court unrepresented by counsel." 802 F.2d at 680 n.l.
50. Judge Pollak, of the district court, described Makina as "a client that
presented . . . more than the usual characteristics of intractability that remote
clients can offer." Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 34A (citing Transcript of
November 25, 1985 at 16, Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (No. 76-0742)). The difficulties in this regard could foreseeably
be magnified if Morgan, which is undoubtedly the single contact Makina has with
the proceedings in this case, were permitted to withdraw. 802 F.2d at 678.
51. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 15. Morgan refuted that sugges-
tion as unfounded, since it exerts no control over its former client, Makina. Id.
In Judge Pollak's opinion from the bench, he acknowledged that Morgan may be
"no more likely to be effective in communicating with Makina than [plaintiff's
counsel]." Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 38A (citing Transcript of No-
vember 25, 1985 at 20, Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (No. 76-0742)). However, as that issue was not proven, it was
simply a "matter for speculation" which the district court declined to pursue. Id.
52. It appears that Makina had made it clear that it did not want Morgan to
continue to represent it with respect to the Ohntrups' claim. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d
at 678. Clearly, Morgan does not have the power to force Makina, an unwilling
defendant, to pay. Nor does it have authority to bind its former client by any
unauthorized acts. See, e.g., Carlson v. Nopal Lines, 460 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th
Cir. 1972) (attorney cannot insist on maintaining attorney-client relationship af-
ter discharge); Archbishop v Karlak, 450 Pa. 535, 539, 299 A.2d 294, 296 (1973)
(attorney cannot bind client by his own actions without client's knowledge or
consent); Garnet v. D'Alonzo, 55 Pa. Commw. 263, 265, 422 A.2d 1241, 1242
(1980) (in absence of express authority, attorney is without power to compro-
mise or settle his client's claim).
Furthermore, who would pay Morgan for its services? Although Morgan
may have a claim in quantum meruit against Makina for costs of its services, if
Makina refuses to satisfy its obligation under a legal judgment, it is unlikely to
voluntarily pay Morgan. Notably, there would be no contract claim for further
services rendered, since Makina terminated the contract by discharging them.
For a discussion of recovery based on quantum meruit, see C. WOLFRAM, supra
note 6, § 9.5.2, at 546 n.51; Annotation, Limitation to Quantum Meruit Recovey,
Where Attorney Employed Under Contingent Fee Contract Is Discharged Without Cause, 92
A.L.R. 3d 690 (1979).
53. Attorneys "may not reasonably be required to soldier on in the face of
their clients' declared refusal and inability to compensate them." Silverman v.
Senft, [No. 84 Civ. 393-CSH,] slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1986). In Silverman,
defendants were without funds and wished to discharge their attorney and ap-
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Of course, the interest of the Ohntrups seems compelling as well. 54
The Ohntrups are judgment creditors trying to enforce their judgment
against an uncooperative foreign defendant corporation.5 5 In reality,
however, the position of the Ohntrups is no different than that of ajudg-
ment creditor who seeks to enforce his claim against a judgment-proof
defendant or a defendant who has entered bankruptcy.5 6 Unlike the
typical judgment creditor, however, the Ohntrups' position is arguably
complicated by the fact that the defendant is a wholly foreign corpora-
tion which has no assets within reach of the court. Therefore, the root
of their problem may really be the overextension of a "minimum con-
tacts" analysis in which the court exercised jurisdiction over a party
against whom it had no practical means of enforcing a subsequent judg-
ment. 57 It is submitted that as a result of this overextension, the Ohntrup
pear pro se. Id. The court found grounds to grant permissive withdrawal under
DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(f). Id. It is significant, however, that when the motion was filed
in Silverman, the clients were both in federal prison. Id. Thus, there was little
concern that the court might lose contact with the defendants, which was of pri-
mary importance to the court in Ohntrup. See 802 F.2d at 679.
54. For a discussion of the countervailing interests, see supra notes 37 & 46
and accompanying text.
55. Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 679.
56. Unsecured creditors generally receive little or no distribution when
their debtors go bankrupt. A. COHEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND
OTHER DEBTOR-CREDITOR MATTERS § 22-100, at 452 (1981). For example, sta-
tistics for the year ending June 30, 1977, indicate that unsecured creditors re-
ceived payments which amounted to only 4.5% of their claims. Id. n.1;
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Tables of Bankruptcy Statis-
tics, Tables F-4A, F-6 (July 1978). Thus, the position of an unsecured creditor is
uncertain at best.
57. The district court originally found in Ohntrup v. Firearms that Makina had
sufficient contacts by its commercial activities with the United States to give that
court jurisdiction over the suit. 516 F. Supp. 1281, 1285-86 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
The court reasoned that although the sales agreement between Makina and FCI
was concluded in Turkey, the entire relationship between them was one which
was intended to have "substantial contacts" with the United States. Id. The
district court noted the following in support of its conclusion: (1) the agree-
ment lists FCI's location as Victoria, Texas, U.S.A.; (2) Makina agreed that FCI
will be its "exclusive representative.., in U.S.A.;" (3) the agreement provided
for a minimum order of 1000 pistols "to sell in U.S.A." with a 20% renewal of
the contract; (4) the contract required FCI to provide service to "the customers
in U.S.A." and "not jeopardize [Makina's] reputation . . . by poor service or
untrue practices;" and (5) by letter, Makina exercised its rights to monitor FCI's
advertising practices in the United States. Id. Apparently, Makina also solicited
business in the United States. Id. at 1287. Since Makina intended that the pis-
tols be imported and sold in the United States, the court found sufficient evi-
dence of "substantial contacts" to conclude that Makina fell within the
"commercial activity exception" of 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(2). Id. at 1286. For a
further discussion of the commercial activity exception, see supra note 11.
Furthermore, based on the same factors, the court found that Makina had
"'purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting business,' " thereby
meeting the minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), as interpreted by Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958). Ohnirup v. Firearms, 516 F. Supp. at 1287 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at
906 [Vol. 32: p. 895
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court was forced to employ the Code to require Morgan to remain in the
case for the sole purpose of providing the court with a "minimum con-
tact" with the foreign-based Makina.
5 8
Additionally, the Ohntrup court aptly noted that although withdrawal
is required when an attorney is discharged by his client,59 mandatory
withdrawal is qualified by a requirement that counsel seek court ap-
proval where mandated by local rules of court. 60 In Ohntrup, however,
the Third Circuit interpreted the Code as placing that approval within
the court's discretion, without adequately qualifying the extent of such
discretion. 6 1 The Ohntrup court arguably did attempt to qualify the dis-
253). Thus, the court found Makina's action to fall within commercial acts which
cause a " 'direct effect' " in the United States. Ohntrup v. Firearms, 516 F. Supp.
at 1287.
58. It is submitted that using the Disciplinary Rules in this manner, to jus-
tify personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, is not the purpose for which
these rules were intended. The Code's Preamble and Preliminary Statement set
forth the aims and purposes for which the Code was promulgated:
The Model Code is designed to be adopted by appropriate agencies
both as an inspirational guide to members of the profession and as a
basis for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below
the required minimum standards stated in the Disciplinary Rules.... A
lawyer should ultimately be responsible for the conduct of his employ-
ees and associates in the course of the professional representation of
the client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980).
Notably, the Preliminary Statement does not suggest that the lawyer be held
responsible for the conduct of his client, nor that the rules be used to maintain
jurisdiction over a party, See id.
59. 802 F.2d at 679 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-110(B)(4) (1980)). For the text of DR 2-1 10(B)(4), see supra note 24.
60. 802 F.2d at 679 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-110(A)(1) (1980)). Although DR 2-110(B) provides for "[m]andatory
withdrawal," the Code injects an element of discretion through DR 2-1 10(A)(1)
by requiring court permission for withdrawal in compliance with the rules of a
tribunal. It is suggested that read together, those provisions may be interpreted
to mean that if discharged by his client, counsel's request for court permission to
withdraw is mandatory and, if granted, counsel shall withdraw. In the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, Local Rule 18(c) requires counsel to obtain court ap-
proal before withdrawing. E.D. PA. R. 18(c). For the text of these three rules,
see supra notes 24, 26 & 27. See also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 6, § 9.5.1, at 544
(when lawyer wishes or is forced to terminate representation, compliance with
applicable local rules governing withdrawal from pending litigation is "overrid-
ing requirement" (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
110(B)(4) (1980))).
61. 802 F.2d at 679. The court did suggest that the district court's decision
was reviewable under an "abuse of discretion standard." Id. However, because
the Third Circuit held that there was no abuse of discretion in this case, the
court did not indicate what would constitute such an abuse in the context of a
court's refusal to grant a motion for leave to withdraw. See id.
The only prior case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania discussing denial
of a motion for leave to withdraw is Brand v. NCC Corp., a case which bears little
factual similarity to this case. 540 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In Brand, coun-
sel for defendant entered his appearance six months after defaultjudgment had
been entered against the defendant, and then participated in several settlement
13
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trict court's discretion by stating that a firm may withdraw when it dem-
onstrates that "its appearance serves no meaningful purpose."
6 2
However, the court defeated this alleged qualification of the district
court's discretion by requiring the firm to make this demonstration "to
the satisfaction of the district court."
6 3
The vague standard for withdrawal approved by the Ohntrup court
lacks predictability and makes it difficult, if not impossible, for counsel
to know whether he will in fact be permitted to withdraw, even after
termination of the employment relationship by his client. As a result, an
attorney must remain in an action in which he has no client, and thus, no
authority to act on its behalf.64 It is submitted that the dubious behavior
of a former client does not justify forcing counsel to remain in a case,
merely as a "conduit for service" 6 5 in post-judgment proceedings after
conferences. Id. at 564. At the last conference prior to the hearing, the attorney
informed the court that if those settlement efforts failed, "his client had in-
structed him to cease representation." Id. When efforts to reach a settlement
did fail, he submitted his motion for leave to withdraw. Id. The court stated that
defendant could not have counsel appear on its behalf and yet limit counsel's
authority to participating in settlement negotiations. Id. at 565. Citing Local
Rule 18(c), the district court stated that "[1leave of court for withdrawal, absent
the simultaneous appearance of substitute counsel, is within the court's discre-
tion .... [T]he court, in its discretion, denied leave." 540 F. Supp. at 564.
While the Ohntrup decision is not inconsistent with Brand, it, like Brand, fails
to qualify the extent of the district court's discretion. See 802 F.2d at 679-80. In
addition, the Ohntrup court failed to address the issue of when an attorney
should be permitted to withdraw, or, conversely, required to remain in a case.
See id.
62. 802 F.2d at 680. Specifically, the court stated: "[W]e conclude that a
law firm is entitled to withdraw once the firm demonstrates to the satisfaction of
the district court that its appearance serves no meaningful purpose, particularly
insofar as an opposing interest is concerned." Id.
63. Id. It is submitted that this language leaves the discretion of the district
court in the same undefined and unguided state that it was in prior to the Ohn-
trup decision. Interestingly, the Ohntrup court suggested that Morgan should at
least remain in the case until the Ohntrups "have exhausted meaningful efforts
to satisfy their judgment." Id. at 680 n.I. While this suggestion may limit Mor-
gan's duty as compared to the duty defined by the district court, it does little to
qualify the discretion of the district court.
64. See Carlson v. Nopal Lines, 460 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1972) (attor-
ney may not insist that attorney-client relationship continue); Garnet v.
D'Alonzo, 55 Pa. Commw. 263, 265, 422 A.2d 1241, 1242 (1980) (absent ex-
press authority, attorney may not "undertake unauthorized acts which may re-
sult in the surrender of any substantial right of the client").
65. Finck v. Finck, 354 N.W.2d 198, 201 (S.D. 1984). The facts of Finck
merit discussion. Following divorce proceedings in which a husband was or-
dered to pay alimony, he disappeared and stopped making such payments. Id. at
199. Since his whereabouts were unknown, the wife instituted proceedings to
garnish his Navy retirement pay by means of service on the husband's attorney.
Id. at 200. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to communicate with his client,
the husband's attorney filed a motion to withdraw. Id. The Supreme Court of
South Dakota held that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant
withdrawal without substitute appearance. Id. Although the court appreciated
"the plight of appellee, who will be forced to seek other remedies should this
908
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the client has voluntarily terminated the attorney-client relationship. 66
Moreover, it is submitted that the undefined discretion exercised by
the district court and approved by the Third Circuit in Ohnlrup6 7 will
likely invite an increase in litigation. If withdrawal is not made
mandatory upon discharge by one's client 6 8 or if clear boundaries are
not placed on the district court's discretion, 6 9 the courts will be forced
to make an ad hoc determination in each case. Furthermore, Ohntrup
offers little guidance by which courts may make this determination. 70 If
the court's decision is based upon a balance of the parties' competing
interests, when do the equities tip the scale ofjustice to require an attor-
ney to remain in a case after his client has terminated the attorney-client
relationship?
7 1
attorney be permitted to withdraw," it held that "we cannot sanction a virtual
bondage of appellant's attorney whereby he is punished for the acts of a client
which are totally out of his control." Id. at 200-0 1. In noting that at some point,
the attorney-client relationship must be allowed to end, the court recognized
that an attorney could not "fairly represent a client, in the best interests of that
client, when the client insists on remaining incommunicado." Id. at 201.
When faced with countervailing interests similar to those in Ohntrup, the
Finck court found, in a well-reasoned opinion, that the equities balanced the op-
posite way, in favor of permitting withdrawal. Id. The potential burden on the
attorney outweighed any inconvenience to Mrs. Finck, as there was still an avail-
able avenue through which her judgment could be satisfied. See id. at 200. On
the other hand, the Ohntrup court emphasized the lack of alternate effective
means of communication, but gave little attention to the potential difficulties
facing the attorney. See 802 F.2d at 679. It is also interesting to note that in
Finck there was no indication that the attorney had been discharged by his client,
as was the case in Ohntrup. For a discussion of the countervailing interests
weighed by the court in Ohntrup, see supra notes 37 & 46 and accompanying text.
66. If Makina has not authorized the law firm to act on its behalf, Morgan
has no control over it. Practically speaking, therefore, when the plaintiffs serve
their papers on Morgan, Morgan can only turn around and mail them to Makina.
That alone would hardly seem to be justification for refusing to allow counsel to
withdraw. At that point, the attorney is "literally acting as a post office." Brief
and Appendix for Appellant at 27A (citing Transcript of November 25, 1985 at
8, Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (No. 76-
0742)).
67. See 802 F.2d at 679-80; see also Brand v. NCC Corp., 540 F. Supp. 562
(E.D. Pa. 1982). For a discussion of Brand, see supra note 61.
68. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1 10(C) (1980) lists
grounds for permissive withdrawal. Specifically, DR 2-1 10(C)(5) provides for such
permissive withdrawal of the attorney if: "His client knowingly and freely as-
sents to termination of his employment." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(5) (1980). If a court may, in its discretion, deny
permission to withdraw when a client fires his attorney, it is questionable
whether there is a material difference between DR 2-1 10(B)(4) and DR 2-
1 10(C)(5). For the text of DR 2-1 10(B)(4), see supra note 24.
69. For a discussion of the court's discretion, see supra notes 60-63 and ac-
companying text.
70. See 802 F.2d at 679-80. The court did indicate that a law firm may be
permitted to withdraw at some point if the court is satisfied that "its appearance
serves no meaningful purpose." Id. at 680.
71. Relevant case law provides little elaboration on this vague standard.
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While it is arguable that the Ohntrup court reached an equitable de-
cision on the facts of this case,72 the effect of the Ohntrup decision is to
create a practical uncertainty for the practitioner. Although the Code
directs mandatory withdrawal when an attorney is discharged by his cli-
ent,7 3 Ohntrup empowers a court with discretion to force an attorney to
remain in a case on behalf of a former client who is hostile to the attor-
ney's representation. Although the Ohntrup court suggested that an at-
torney may withdraw when he demonstrates his representation "serves
no meaningful purpose," it is submitted that this language fails to guide
courts or practitioners as to the standard to be applied.7 4 In addition, if
See, e.g., Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1978) (withdrawal
allowed when no unique, countervailing factors to balance against granting mo-
tion, other than traditional interests ofjudicial economy); Leedy v. Hartnett, 510
F. Supp. 1125, 1126 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (withdrawal permitted when "[i]t is not
desirable to require counsel to continue to serve when there exists no chance of
his being compensated for his services and ... there is no reason to expect any
other counsel to undertake to represent [defendant]"), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d 686
(3d Cir. 1982); Finck v. Finck, 354 N.W.2d 198, 201 (S.D. 1984) (withdrawal
granted because "at some point" attorney-client relationship must be allowed to
cease). But see ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Lawco Energy, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 708, 713
(S.D. W. Va. 1980) (withdrawal denied since effective court administration re-
quires attorney to provide court with means to maintain communications with
client); Thomas v. National State Bank, 628 P.2d 188, 189 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981)
(withdrawal refused when attorney's withdrawal would be prejudicial to all par-
ties); In re Marriage of Milovich, 105 Ill. App. 3d 596, 615, 434 N.E.2d 811, 826
(1982) (withdrawal denied upon consideration of whether withdrawal would
"'unduly prejudice the other party or interfere with the administration of jus-
tice,' " and whether party seeking withdrawal would be prejudiced by denial)
(citation omitted); Farkas v. Sadler, 119 R.I. 35, 41, 375 A.2d 960, 963 (1977)
(withdrawal refused after considering reasons necessitating withdrawal, efficient
and proper function of court and effect that granting or denying motion will
have on parties to litigation).
72. For a discussion of the equities involved in this case, see supra notes 36-
58 and accompanying text.
73. For a discussion of mandatory and permissive withdrawal under the
Code, see supra notes 24 & 68 and accompanying text.
74. The Ohntrup decision does not address a practically significant question
that is raised: whether and, if so, to what extent the court may impose sanctions
for failure to comply with a court order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) where the
court requires an attorney to remain in a case after being dismissed by his client.
While none of the enumerated sanctions of Rule 37(b)(2) would be applicable to
this post-judgment situation, the final paragraph of Rule 37(b)(2) provides as
follows:
In lieu of the foregoing orders . . . the court shall require the party
failing to obey the order or the attorney advising that party or both to
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justifed or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (emphasis added). Notably, the rule makes the imposi-
tion of such sanction mandatory, unless "the disobedient party ... show[s] that
his failure is justified or that special circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust." Id. advisory committee's note.
It is apparent in Ohntrup that an attempt to impose such a sanction on
Makina would meet with little chance of success, since Makina refused even to
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the Third Circuit found that, based on the facts on Ohntrup, continued
representation was appropriate, one must wonder what it will take to
find representation no longer meaningful.
It is arguable that the mistake Morgan made was not in moving to
withdraw, but in moving to withdraw too soon. 75 It is suggested that in
future cases, when an attorney is discharged by his client, the law firm
should carefully develop a complete record to demonstrate, not only the
client's termination of the relationship, but also the extent to which the
attorney is thereafter unable to communicate with or effectively repre-
sent this former client. 76 In that case, the law firm would at least have a
factual record to bring before the court on which it could base its asser-
tion that it was acting merely as a "conduit for service."
Aware of the result in Ohntrup, it is possible that lawyers in the
Third Circuit may want to reconsider representing "Makina-like" clients
in the first place, thereby making it difficult for such individuals to se-
cure representation. Furthermore, as a result of the Ohntrup decision,
courts will be required to make ad hoc determinations of each motion
comply with the court-entered judgment against it. Therefore, the more signifi-
cant question is whether the court may impose this sanction on Morgan, as
Makina's attorney. While the language of the rule expressly provides for the
imposition of expenses on the attorney, such an imposition would result in sanc-
tioning an attorney for the utter misbehavior of a client who, in fact, has termi-
nated that attorney-client relationship. It is submitted that for the court first to
refuse to allow the attorney to withdraw after being discharged, and then to
impose additional sanctions on that attorney for the continued noncompliance
of his former client, would work a gross injustice. On the other hand, if Morgan
proves that "special circumstances make an award of expenses unjust" and,
thus, the court refrains from imposing such expenses on the attorney, it would
appear that the court is essentially left without effective available sanctions.
However, the Third Circuit failed to address the question of sanctions and the
potential problems of court administration which flow from the Ohntrup
decision.
For a discussion of the lack of guidance given by the Ohntrup court and the
problems related thereto, see supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
75. See 802 F.2d at 680. The court stated that it could not say that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion, "particularly in light of the short lapse of time"
between entry of judgment and the decision denying the motion to withdraw.
Id. It is unclear, however, just how long Morgan should have waited, especially
in light of the facts which seemingly indicate that its representation served "no
meaningful purpose." See id. at 679-80; see also Brief and Appendix for Appellant
at 38A-40A (citing Transcript of November 25, 1985 at 20-22, Ohntrup v. Fire-
arms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (No. 76-0742)).
76. It is submitted that Morgan might have made a factual record docu-
menting the following: each and every phone call to Makina, whether the call
was received and, if so, by whom and the content of the conversation; any let-
ters, motions or documents from plaintiffs or the court which Morgan received
and merely forwarded to Makina; copies of any letters sent by Morgan to
Makina, or received by Morgan from Makina, documentation as to receipt
thereof, and whether the letters received any response; and any other communi-
cation, or a lack of communication, between Morgan and Makina. Perhaps this
type of record would be sufficient to "satisfactorily demonstrate" to the court
that Morgan's representation no longer served any "meaningful purpose."
1987]
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requesting leave to withdraw because of discharge by a client. When
these factors are added to the scale, one may wonder whether the equi-
ties still balance in favor of refusing to grant counsel leave to
withdraw.*
Kristine Y. Schmidt
*On October 16, 1987, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an or-
der adopting a new Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter Code] and
rules of Professional Conduct, which shall take effect on April 1, 1988.
Although not specifically applicable to the Ohntrup case itself, the author deemed
it appropriate to mention the changes relevant to those rules regulating attorney
withdrawal. Rule 1.16 of the new Code regulates conditions for "declining or
terminating representation."
Rule 1.16(a) essentially is the counterpart of Model Code DR 2-110(B), as it
lists conditions in which the attorney shall withdraw, and provides as follows:
"Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a cli-
ent if ... (3) the lawyer is discharged." Code, Rule 1.16(a). For the text of DR 2-
1 10(B)(4), see supra note 24. This rule is qualified on its face by reference to
paragraph (c), which provides: "When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer
shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the
representation." Code, Rule 1.16(c). While this provision qualifies withdrawal
and is, therefore, similar to DR 2-11 0(A)(1), the language of the new Code sug-
gests that the court's power to order a lawyer to continue representation is
somewhat broader, as it is not limited to thse cases where "permission . . . is
required by rules of the tribunal," as was true under the Model Code. For the
text of DR 2-11 0(A)(1), see supra note 26. Finally, paragraph (b) of Rule 1.16
provides conditions under which a lawyer may withdraw, which is similar to DR
2-110(C) that provides for permissive withdrawal.
It is arguable that the new Code eliminates some of the tension between the
Model Code and local rules of court which required court permission prior to
withdrawal. Because the Code includes a provision, Rule 1.16(c), which implic-
itely authorizes a court to order a lawyer to continue representation, the Code
appears to provide the courts with even greater authority to exercise their dis-
cretion in that decision. However, neither the rule nor the comment thereto
provide any guidance as to how a court should exercise that discretion. There-
fore, it is submitted that the court's decision in Ohntrup would not be affected by
the new Code. However, the corollary to that proposition is also true, that the
uncertainties and lack of guidance of the Ohntrup decision remain unresolved.
912
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol32/iss3/11
